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573 
Note 
The Post-Grant Problem: America Invents Falling 
Short 
Kayla Fossen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act (AIA), the United States operated a patent system that was 
in many ways unique among developed nations. For example, 
priority was determined by the first applicant to invent the 
process or item in question,1 an applicant had to disclose the 
“best mode” for practicing the claimed invention,2 and the pro-
cess for review of a patent after issuance was extremely lim-
ited.3 Additionally, the patent prosecution system in the United 
States was a slow, inefficient process.4 Patents were frequently 
invalidated, and those that were not invalidated required an 
inordinate amount of time and resources to defend.5 In an at-
tempt to address these issues, Congress passed AIA.6 Under 
the new system many of the differences between the U.S. pa-
tent system and the European patent system have been har-
                                                          
© 2013 Kayla Fossen 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. The au-
thor would like to thank Professor Ruth Okediji, Professor Thomas Cotter, and 
Brad Pedersen for their inspiration and expertise and the editors and staff of 
the journal for all their hard work. 
 1. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); United States Patent and Trademark OFFICE, 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE §§ 2138.01 pt. I, 2165 (8th ed. 
2010) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
 3. See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 256–57 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 4. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 1–2 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (identifying weak-
nesses in the current U.S. patent system and proposing methods for improving 
the system). 
 5. Id. at 4. 
 6. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt.1, at 38–40. 
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monized,7 a new post-grant review process has been estab-
lished,8 and the ability of third parties to participate has been 
significantly increased.9 It has yet to be determined, however, 
whether these changes will effectively promote the goals estab-
lished by Congress. 
The goal of this Note is to determine whether the new post-
grant system established under AIA will ameliorate those is-
sues identified by Congress as problematic within the current 
patent regime. Part I of this Note will describe the current in-
ternational framework for patents as established by the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), the current United States patent regime, the 
current European patent regime, and the changes to the U.S. 
patent regime made by AIA. Part II compares the changes 
made by AIA—in particular changes regarding the new post-
grant review—to the European system they are modeled after. 
Part III identifies failures and proposes a more selective pre-
grant review system to address the failures. This Note con-
cludes that, while the new patent regime created by AIA takes 
important steps towards addressing patent strength and litiga-
tion issues, under the current legal system a more stringent 
pre-grant review is necessary to meet the goals of AIA. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. TRIPS: THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOMESTIC 
PATENT LAW 
Patent law in all World Trade Organization (WTO) coun-
tries, including the United States, is governed by TRIPS.10 
Signed in 1994, TRIPS attempts to harmonize intellectual 
property protection in order to promote free trade among mem-
                                                          
 7. Id. at 39. 
 8. Id. at 45. 
 9. Id. at 45–46. 
 10. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 14, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Frequently Asked Ques-
tions About TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 
2012). There are 157 member nations, including all major developed nations. 
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
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ber nations.11 TRIPS encompasses not only patents, but also 
copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, topographies of integrated circuits, trade secrets, and 
anti-competitive behaviors.12 Prior to TRIPS, international pa-
tent law harmonization was governed by the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Arts of 1967 (ParC).13 ParC was 
so widely accepted as a model that large portions of it are in-
corporated by reference into TRIPS.14 Between ParC and 
TRIPS, standards for patent regimes have been established. 
These standards range from time frames for protections (not 
less than twenty years from filing)15 to rights conferred.16 Some 
standards include: 
• The same rights must be granted to foreigners as citi-
zens.17 
• The filing date of a domestic patent application in one 
country will be the effective date for patent applications 
filed in all other countries, provided that subsequent ap-
plications are filed within the grace period.18 
• With limited exceptions, individual technologies cannot 
be discriminated against.19 
• Exclusive use rights are granted, though compulsory li-
censing may be required by granting countries.20 
• The invention must be disclosed in a manner that would 
enable a person skilled in the art to practice the inven-
tion;21 and 
• “An opportunity for judicial review of any decision to re-
                                                          
 11. NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 40 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 12. Id. at 29. 
 13. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter ParC]. 
 14. TRIPS, supra note 10, at art. 2. 
 15. Id. at art. 33. 
 16. Id. at art. 28. 
 17. Id. at art. 1. 
 18. ParC, supra note 13, at art. 4. 
 19. TRIPS, supra note 10, at art. 27; PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 11, 
at 167. 
 20. TRIPS, supra note 10, at arts. 28, 30; ParC, supra note 13, at art. 5; 
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2012). 
 21. TRIPS, supra note 10, at art. 29. 
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voke or forfeit a patent shall be available.”22 
There is no initial procedure or required reason prescribed 
for revocation, so any revocation is at the discretion of the pa-
tent-granting states.23 The requirement for judicial appeal and 
a lack of direction as to what form this appeal must take have 
led to a wide range of mechanisms for challenging patents and 
appealing those decisions. For example, the United States uses 
a reexamination process in addition to federal litigation, while 
Europe uses a post-grant opposition system.24 
B. RE-ISSUE, REEXAMINE: THE CURRENT U.S. PATENT REGIME 
In the United States the federal government is granted the 
power to issue patents for the promotion of the “[p]rogress of 
Science and useful Arts” by the U.S. Constitution.25 As a re-
ward for investment and public disclosure an inventor is grant-
ed a limited monopoly for the claimed invention for a period of 
time, typically twenty years from the date the application was 
filed.26 An invention could be a “process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter.”27 There are, however, certain 
classes of inventions that cannot be patented, including laws of 
nature (e.g. gravity), natural phenomena (e.g. naturally occur-
ring minerals), and abstract ideas (e.g. mathematical algo-
rithms).28 
The process for obtaining a patent is a long one, on average 
taking up to three years to obtain a single patent.29 Additional-
ly, the granting of a patent is not guaranteed. In order to obtain 
a patent the inventor must apply, and the invention must meet 
some very basic requirements. The invention must be novel, 
have utility, and must be a non-obvious improvement over any 
                                                          
 22. Id. at art. 32. 
 23. PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 11, at 372–73. 
 24. MUELLER, supra note 3, at 256–57, 263. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006); Kevin R. Davidson, Retooling Patents: Current 
Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Economic Implications for Patent Reform, 8 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 425, 428 (2008); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974). 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 28. MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2106. 
 29. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 604 
(2005). 
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prior inventions (prior art).30 The process for obtaining a pa-
tent—patent prosecution—tends to follow a standard trajecto-
ry. First the inventor or his legal representative files a patent 
application.31 The patent examiner then determines what the 
inventor is trying to patent, whether it has utility, what rele-
vant prior art exists, and if the invention claimed would not be 
obvious to a person “skilled in the art” in light of the prior art.32 
Even if all of these requirements are met, under the current 
first-to-invent system, the applicant will not receive the patent 
if there is another inventor who filed an application after, but 
nevertheless invented before the applicant.33 
After the patent is granted, the validity of the patent can 
be challenged three different ways. First, the validity may be 
challenged in federal court.34 When validity is challenged in 
court there is a presumption that all issued patents are valid, 
and in order to invalidate a patent the challenging party must 
meet a “clear and convincing evidence” standard.35 Second, the 
validity may be challenged in an ex parte reexamination pro-
ceeding.36 Anyone can request an ex parte reexamination, but 
only the patent holder can participate in the proceedings.37 As a 
result, there are no estoppel consequences for third parties if 
the validity is challenged later in federal court, and the ruling 
of the examiner cannot be appealed by third parties to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).38 
                                                          
 30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103. 
 31. MUELLER, supra note 3, at 38. 
 32. MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2144.08. 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011); MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2138.01. 
There are some limitations to this rule. Someone claiming to have invented 
first who applied second must initiate an interference proceeding. MPEP, su-
pra note 2, at § 2301. This second applicant must not have “abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed” the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); MPEP, supra note 2, 
at § 2138.03. An unreasonable delay in filing can be considered suppression or 
concealment. MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2138.03; see Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 
647, 656 (C.C.P.A. 1976). Additionally, there must be reasonable diligence to 
reduce the invention to practice and to file an application. MPEP, supra note 
2, at § 2138.06. 
 34. MUELLER, supra note 3, at 32–36; see also Davidson, supra note 26, at 
442–43. 
 35. MUELLER, supra note 3, at 364–65. 
 36. Id. at 258–62. 
 37. Id. at 258. 
 38. Compare id. at 258 (explaining the third-party requester’s level of par-
ticipation in an ex parte reexamination), with id. at 263–64 (explaining the 
procedure of inter partes reexamination, which includes the option for the 
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Finally, the validity may be challenged in an inter partes 
reexamination.39 In an inter partes reexamination, third parties 
have an opportunity to participate in the arguments surround-
ing validity.40 As a result, third parties that participate are es-
topped from raising any question of invalidity that could have 
been brought up at the reexamination proceedings, are allowed 
to appeal any ruling first to the BPAI and then to the federal 
circuit, and can request the court stay any federal litigation de-
pendent on the validity of the patent until a decision is reached, 
but the court need not grant it.41 In both ex parte and inter 
partes reexaminations there must be a substantial new ques-
tion of patentability based solely on published patents or print-
ed publications, and only a preponderance of the evidence is re-
quired.42 Ex parte reexaminations are used rarely (roughly 
0.2% of issued patents).43 Since its enactment in 1999, inter 
partes reexaminations have been increasing, but there is no ev-
idence that they will be used at a significantly higher rate than 
ex parte reexaminations.44 
Some minor changes were made to U.S. patent law as a re-
sult of signing onto TRIPS.45 Patent terms are now twenty 
years from the date of filing, instead of seventeen years from 
issuance.46 Foreign inventers are now allowed to use evidence 
of practice or development in WTO countries to establish inven-
tion dates.47 The definition of infringement was expanded,48 
                                                          
third-party requester to appeal to the BPAI and is subject to the estoppel pro-
vision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2006)). 
 39. Id. at 263. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 263–65. 
 42. MPEP, supra note 2, at § 706.I; Sherry M. Knowles, Thomas E. Van-
derbloemen & Charles E. Peeler, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination in the 
United States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 611–12 (2004). 
 43. Dale L. Carlson & Robert A. Migliorini, Patent Reform at the Cross-
roads: Experience in the Far East with Oppositions Suggests an Alternative 
Approach for the United States, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 261, 269 (2006). 
 44. From 2006 through 2010, 973,368 patents were issued, and 903 inter 
partes reexaminations were filed (~0.1%). U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 
129, 137 [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010]. 
 45. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 58 (5th ed. 2011). 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 45, at 58. 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 104; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 45, at 58. 
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and provisional applications were introduced.49 Despite these 
attempts at global harmonization, major differences between 
the United States and other national patent regimes still exist. 
C. PATTERNING AFTER PATENT OPPOSITION: THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM OF POST-GRANT REVIEW 
European patents are governed by the European Patent 
Convention (EPC),50 an agreement allowed by ParC.51 Under 
the EPC, any patent granted by the European Patent Office 
(EPO) is enforceable in any contracting country as if it were a 
national patent.52 In order for a patent to be issued the inven-
tion must be “[novel], include an inventive step, and [be] sus-
ceptible [to] industrial application.”53 Like in U.S. patent law, 
novelty is determined based on a comparison with only a single 
piece of prior art, not a combination of multiple pieces.54 The 
inventive step, like the non-obvious requirement in U.S. patent 
law, should be determined based on the combination of all rele-
vant prior art.55 European patent applications are published 
the sooner of eighteen months after the filing date or eighteen 
months after the priority date—a date prior to the filing that 
the application claims is a better representation of when the 
invention was originally claimed—and priority rules are based 
on ParC and EPC rules.56 Third parties who feel they have im-
portant information regarding an application can submit in-
formation relevant to the patent proceedings during the appli-
cation process in filings called “observations.”57 Once a patent 
is issued, it is enforceable for twenty years from the filing 
date.58 European patents are enforced at the national level.59 
                                                          
 48. 35 U.S.C. § 271; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 45, at 58 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 111; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 45, at 58. 
 50. European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter 
EPC]. 
 51. ParC, supra note 13, at art. 19; IAN MUIR ET AL., EUROPEAN PATENT 
LAW: LAW AND PROCEDURE  UNDER THE EPC AND PCT 2 (2d ed. 2002). 
 52. EPC, supra note 50, at art. 2; MUIR ET AL., supra note 51, at 2. 
 53. EPC, supra note 50, at art. 52. 
 54. Id. at art. 54; MUIR ET AL., supra note 51, at 177; see MPEP, supra 
note 2, at § 2131.01. 
 55. EPC, supra note 50, at art. 56; MUIR ET AL., supra note 51, at 189; see 
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2141. 
 56. EPC, supra note 50, at arts. 87–89, 93. 
 57. Id. at art. 115. 
 58. Id. at art. 63. 
 59. See MUIR ET AL., supra note 51, at 131. 
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Unlike the United States, Europe operates under a first-to-
file system.60 This means, if two inventors claim the same in-
vention in two different patent applications the first person 
that constructively filed their application under the ParC, ra-
ther than the first to invent, will receive the patent.61 Also, un-
like the United States, the EPC operates a post-grant patent 
opposition system.62 The post-grant opposition must be filed 
within nine months of the grant of the patent in question.63 It 
can be filed by anyone other than the patent holder and is a 
contentious proceeding between the patentee and the opposi-
tion party.64 In the United States reexaminations can only be 
issued for substantial new questions of patentability based on 
printed prior art, but the EPC opposition proceedings allow for 
challenges based on a large number of factors including a lack 
of novelty, a lack of inventive step, a lack of industrial applica-
tion, a lack of adequate disclosure, an inadmissible amend-
ment, or that the subject matter is not an invention or a pa-
tentable subject matter.65 Like the inter partes reexamination 
in the United States, an opposition can stay an infringement 
suit in any of the contracting nations.66 If a third party wishes 
to intervene in an opposition they must file a notice of opposi-
tion statement, which lays out the grounds upon which the op-
position is being requested and any evidence to support those 
grounds.67 Three examiners, two of which must be new to the 
patent in question, are assigned to each opposition.68 Unlike 
the United States’ reexaminations, evidence can be admitted 
beyond printed prior art.69 After evidence is submitted and oral 
                                                          
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011); Seth T. Carnathan, Patent Priority 
Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-Invent”, 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 
755–57 (1998). 
 61. Carnathan, supra note 60, at 757–58. 
 62. EPC, supra note 50, at art. 99. 
 63. Id. 
 64. MUIR ET AL., supra note 51, at 226–31. 
 65. EPC, supra note 50, at art. 100; MUIR ET AL., supra note 51, at 237. 
Some countries, like Germany, allow for national level opposition proceedings. 
Other countries, like the U.K., do not. 
 66. Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 276. 
 67. EPC, supra note 50, at art. 105; Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, 
at 276. 
 68. Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 277. 
 69. Id. at 278; see 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2205. 
FOSSEN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:51 AM 
2013] THE POST-GRANT PROBLEM 581 
arguments are heard, the court will render a decision and re-
voke the patent, reject the opposition, or allow the patent to 
continue.70 The result is binding on all EPC countries.71 Either 
party can appeal the opposition ruling.72 Estoppel only applies 
if the patent is revoked altogether; there is no longer a valid 
patent, so there are no longer any legal arguments for or 
against it.73 As a part of the overall argument for global patent 
harmonization, which began with TRIPS, there has been a 
push to institute a post-grant opposition type system in the 
United States.74 
After the opposition period has passed, some European 
countries allow validity to be challenged on any grounds, in 
some cases even without a case or controversy—a standing re-
quirement for any U.S. case, including patent cases.75 If the pa-
tent is found invalid in one of these proceedings it is only inva-
lid in that jurisdiction, e.g. a German court can only invalidate 
a patent in Germany.76 
D. ADDING AIA: FUTURE CHANGES TO U.S. PATENT LAW 
Serious calls for patent reform began in 2004 when the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a report outlining 
the shortcomings of the current patent regime and proposing 
solutions.77 The report found seven issues in the current regime 
including an inability to quickly respond to new technologies, 
issuing too many low quality patents, excessive periods of time 
required to defend the validity of a patent, and inconsistencies 
with international patent regimes.78 The quality of patents was 
especially problematic, as low quality patents are more likely to 
be litigated and invalidated, creating uncertainty and under-
                                                          
 70. Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 278. 
 71. See EPC, supra note 50, at art. 99; Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 
43, at 276. 
 72. EPC, supra note 50, at art. 107. 
 73. Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 280. 
 74. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 321 (2005). 
 75. Countries that allow validity challenges include Germany, France, the 
U.K., and Switzerland. See Malwina Mejer & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie, Economic Incongruities in the European Patent System 6 (ECARES, 
Working Paper No. 2009-003, 2009). 
 76. See id. at 6; Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 276. 
 77. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4; H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39 
n.5 (2011). 
 78. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 41–80. 
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mining the goal of the patent system.79 When fully litigated, 
more than forty-six percent of U.S. patents are found invalid.80 
This statistic, however, may be expected. Patent litigation is 
extremely expensive, so truly questionable patents are far more 
likely to make it through trial without being settled.81 Possible 
causes for the decrease in patent quality include an overbur-
dened USPTO examiner staff, a high patent approval rate, un-
certainty regarding the standards for newly patentable tech-
nologies, and a dilution of the non-obviousness requirement.82 
The NAS recommended, among other things, a reinvigoration 
of the non-obviousness requirement, a post-grant review sys-
tem similar to the one used by the EPO, and an increase in the 
resources available to the USPTO.83 In addition to these 
strength issues, as the number of patent applications has in-
creased, the examiner staff has remained essentially the same 
size, leading to a backlog of more than 700,000 patent applica-
tions in 2010 and a wait of nearly fifteen months before the 
first office action.84 
As part of his Strategy for American Innovation, on Sep-
tember 16th, 2011, President Obama signed into law the AIA.85 
As the first major overhaul to the U.S. patent regime in nearly 
sixty years, this broad-sweeping patent reform bill claims to in-
crease the efficiency of the patent office, ease of filing, and 
strength of issued patents, while bringing the American system 
in line with the patent regimes of most other developed na-
                                                          
 79. Id. at 46–47. 
 80. Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 264. 
 81. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 48–49. 
 82. Id. at 51–62. From 1993 to 1998, eighty-five percent to ninety-seven 
percent of all patents were eventually allowed. Id. at 53. 
 83. Id. at 87–108. 
 84. Id. at 65; Unreasonable Patent Application Delay and the USPTO 
Backlog, PATENTLY-O (July 9, 2010, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/unreasonable-patent-applicant-
delay-and-the-uspto-backlog.html. 
 85. See  A Strategy for American Innovation: Driving Towards Sustainable 
Growth and Quality Jobs, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmericanInnov
ation/; Josh Lowensohn, Patent Overhaul Signed Into Law by Obama, CNET 
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2011, 1:22 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20107519-
38/patent-overhaul-signed-into-law-by-obama/. 
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tions.86 The momentum towards patent harmonization was be-
gun by TRIPS, but at the time TRIPS was signed, only minor 
changes were made to the U.S. system.87 The AIA, on the other 
hand, has made many major changes to the current U.S. patent 
system, a number of which serve to harmonize the American 
patent system with other industrial nations.88 For example, the 
first and most discussed change is the shift from a “first-to-
invent” to a “first-to-file” system.89 The goals of this change in-
clude reducing confusion in the priority system, reducing the 
initial hurdles in obtaining a valid patent, and streamlining the 
patent system.90 In 2010, 211 patent applications were in inter-
ference, accounting for roughly .02% of all pending patent ap-
plications.91 By creating an objective, easy-to-determine date to 
determine priority, interference proceedings to determine prior-
ity will no longer be necessary.92 This will streamline and speed 
up the process of obtaining a patent by removing another time 
and resource intensive step in the prosecution process.93 De-
spite this change, a patent will still only issue to a person who 
actually invented—rather than copied or reverse engineered—
the invention in question. If an inventor wishes to challenge 
whether a previous filer is a true inventor she may do so under 
a newly established derivation proceeding before the Patent 
                                                          
 86. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Press Release, Mer-
chant & Gould P.C., The America Invents Act Becomes Law (Sept. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.merchantgould.com/CM/NewsAlerts/ 
The%20America%20Invents%20Act%20One%20Becomes%20Law.pdf. 
 87. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 45, at 58. 
 88. For a comprehensive mark-up of the current U.S. patent law, noting 
all American Invents changes, see DENNIS CROUCH, A MARK-UP AND 
COMMENTARY ON THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT (2011) (on file with 
the author). 
 89. See Press Release, Merchant & Gould P.C., supra note 86, at 1. 
 90. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40–42 (2011). 
 91. ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, supra note 44, at 128. 
 92. Janelle Waack, IP: Interference Proceedings in Post-AIA America, 
INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/02/14/ip-
interference-proceedings-in-post-aia-america. 
 93. “Interference proceedings can take years to complete (even if there is 
no appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and require extensive discovery.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 112-98, at 41 (2011). Some new technologies can be tied up in interference 
for the bulk of their relevant patent periods; for example, integrated circuits, 
polymer chemistry, and lasers were all tied up in interference during the bulk 
of their relevant patent protection periods. Lemley, supra note 29, at 611–13. 
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Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), formerly the BPAI.94 To ac-
commodate the new system, the priority and prior art rules 
have been changed.95 All priority dates are based on the filing 
date of the application or any application that it claims priority 
to.96 Prior art now includes any publication prior to the effec-
tive filing date, except any publications or disclosures made by 
the inventor within one year of the filing date.97 The goal of this 
provision is to achieve all the benefits of a first-to-file system 
while still allowing for flexibility for inventors who need time to 
submit a patent application.98 
The second change is an increase in the ability of third par-
ties to submit documents for review during the patent applica-
tion process.99 Currently, third parties can only submit patents 
or publications without explanation within two months after a 
patent is published.100 Under the new law, third parties will be 
able to submit “any patent, published patent application, or 
other printed publication of potential relevance to the examina-
tion of the application,” as well as explanations as to their rele-
vance.101 The fear is, under the current regime, the limitations 
as to what can be submitted, as well as the restrictions on ex-
planations, may decrease the value of these submissions and 
could even deter their use.102 These changes should increase 
the strength of issued patents by ensuring all relevant infor-
mation is disclosed and given due consideration.103 
The third change is the removal of the “best mode” as a 
challenge to the validity or enforcement of a patent.104 Under 
the current regime, in order to obtain a patent the applicant 
must disclose what they see to be the best way to build or per-
form the claimed invention at the time the application is filed—
                                                          
 94. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec.7, § 6, 125 
Stat. 284, 313 (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 42. 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40–43. 
 96. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(a). 
 97. Id. at sec. 3, pt. b. 
 98. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 42. 
 99. Id. at 45. 
 100. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2011); MPEP, supra note 2, at § 1134.01. 
 101. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 8. 
 102. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48–49. 
 103. Id. at 40. 
 104. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 15(a). 
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a subjective standard.105 If the patent does not disclose the best 
mode it may be unenforceable or invalid.106 There is no best 
mode requirement in Europe.107 After AIA, an applicant will 
still be required to disclose the best mode in the application in 
order to obtain the patent, but a potential infringer will no 
longer be able to invalidate the patent based on a lack of best 
mode disclosure.108 By changing this requirement, the United 
States will harmonize its infringement defenses.109 Additional-
ly, by removing a possible challenge, AIA may reduce the 
amount of validity litigation, and thereby strengthen issued pa-
tents.110 
The final major change is the introduction of a post-grant 
review and an inter partes review before the PTAB.111 A post-
grant review may be filed by any party who is not an owner of 
the patent within nine months of issuance or reissuance of a 
patent.112 If the patent at issue is a reissued patent, only claims 
new to a reissue can be challenged.113 Issues beyond patentabil-
ity generally cannot be brought up in the post-grant review, but 
evidence beyond written prior art can be presented.114 A post-
grant review may be allowed upon “a showing that the petition 
raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to 
other patents or patent applications.”115 A post-grant review 
cannot be filed after a civil suit challenging validity is filed, and 
will automatically stay any such suits filed after the review.116 
The final decision can only be appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, and the parties are estopped from argu-
ing the issues again in civil court.117 The parties are permitted, 
however, to settle prior to the decision and thereby avoid estop-
                                                          
 105. MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2165. 
 106. CROUCH, supra note 88, at 120. 
 107. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 121. 
 108. CROUCH, supra note 88, at 55. 
 109. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 121. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Press Release, Merchant & Gould P.C., supra note 86. 
 112. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 6(d), 125 
Stat. 284, 306 (2011). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at sec. 6(a), § 324(b). It is currently uncertain what this will entail, 
but it is possible that it will open up the post-grant review to a much larger 
range of issues than the prior reexamination system allowed. 
 116. Id. at sec. 6(e), § 325. 
 117. Id. 
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pel.118 
The inter partes review can be brought up by any party 
who is not an owner of the patent after the later of the nine 
month period for post-grant review or after the termination of a 
post-grant review.119 Like the prior inter partes reexamination, 
only patentability can be challenged and only printed prior art 
can be submitted.120 The standard for instituting an inter 
partes review is “reasonable likelihood” to prevail, while the 
standard under inter partes reexamination was “substantial 
new question of patentability.”121 Unlike an inter partes reex-
amination, which can be filed during or after civil litigation, an 
inter partes review cannot be filed after a civil suit challenging 
validity is filed and will automatically stay any such suits filed 
after the review.122 The final decision can only be appealed to 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the parties 
are estopped from arguing the issues again in civil court.123 The 
parties are permitted, however, to settle prior to the decision 
and thereby avoid estoppel.124 Settlement was not allowed un-
der the inter partes reexamination and decisions were appealed 
first to the BPAI, and only after BPAI ruling to the Federal 
Circuit.125 These new changes generally take effect on Septem-
ber 16, 2012.126 
While post-grant review and inter partes review share 
many features, including the ability to settle, appeals directly 
to the Federal Circuit, and automatic stays of any subsequent 
validity litigation in the federal courts, it is critical to highlight 
the important differences.127 The most important difference is 
what can be presented as evidence of patentability. In post-
                                                          
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at sec. 6(a). 
 120. Id; see 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2205. 
 121. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a); MUELLER, supra note 3, 
at 257, 259. 
 122. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a); 35 U.S.C. § 318; see 
MPEP, supra note 2, at § 2205. 
 123. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a). 
 124. Id. 
 125. MPEP, supra note 2, at §§ 2659, 2674–83; MUELLER, supra note 3, at 
263–65. 
 126. CROUCH, supra note 88, at 8. 
 127. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, secs. 6(a), (d). 
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grant review the petitioner can present printed prior art (in-
cluding publications and published patents) as well as declara-
tions and affidavits showing expert opinions, statements of the 
inventor, or any other information relevant to the original pa-
tentability.128 Inter partes review, however, remains limited to 
printed prior art.129 Also, changes have been made to what can 
be challenged in the proceedings. In post-grant review, chal-
lenges are no longer limited to patentability, though that is still 
the major use.130 A post-grant review can be allowed for “show-
ing that the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question 
that is important to other patents or patent applications” as 
well as any deficiencies in the declaration.131 Inter partes re-
view still only allows challenges based on patentability.132 The 
final major difference is timing. Post-grant review must be con-
ducted within the first nine months of issuance or reissuance of 
a patent.133 Inter partes review, on the other hand, may only be 
filed after the nine month period for post-grant review has ex-
pired or after the termination of a post-grant review, whichever 
is later, provided it is prior to the end of the patent period.134 
These differences combine to make the post-grant review more 
restrictive than inter partes review with regards to time, but 
more flexible with regards to what validity issues can be chal-
lenged and what evidence can be presented. 
All of these major changes bring the U.S. patent regime 
more into line with the patent systems of other industrialized 
nations. The shift to a first-to-file system and the removal of 
the best mode defense in infringement cases, in particular, re-
move aspects that were once characteristic of only the U.S. pa-
tent regime.135 The changes also go far beyond the standardized 
requirements of TRIPS in harmonizing the patent law of the 
major patent countries. 
                                                          
 128. Id. at sec. 6(d). 
 129. Id. at sec. 6(a). 
 130. Id. at sec. 6(d). 
 131. Id. There is a concern that this standard is ill defined, but it will no 
doubt open up other avenues of challenge within post-grant reviews as com-
pared to reexamination. 
 132. Id. at sec. 6(a). 
 133. Id. at sec. 6(d). 
 134. Id. at sec. 6(a). 
 135. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 45, at 64–65; See NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 124. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Much has been said about the shift from a first-to-invent to 
a first-to-file system in the United States, so it will not be ad-
dressed in this Note.136 This Note will instead address the 
changes to how a patent’s validity can be challenged after issu-
ance and discuss whether the new system will meet the goals 
set out by Congress when it enacted AIA. 
A. THE POST-GRANT PROBLEM: THE CHANGES AND FAILINGS OF 
AIA 
1. Best Mode 
The most prominent reason for changing the “best mode” 
defense against infringement is international harmonization of 
patent law enforcement.137 The United States requires that the 
best mode of practicing the invention be included in the patent 
application.138 Many have argued that this requirement is not 
necessary and is counterproductive.139 Any use of this defense 
is necessarily subjective, because it is difficult to know what 
the state of knowledge was at the time of the application.140 
The European system has no such best mode requirement, and 
therefore no analogous infringement defense.141 By removing 
the defense AIA harmonizes patent law enforcement with the 
international norm.142 
Removing the best mode defense may also further other 
goals of patent reform including increasing the strength of is-
sued patents and decreasing litigation.143 Due to  Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 13(a), claims of invalidity are compulsory 
counterclaims to any infringement suit.144 If a party does not 
                                                          
 136. See, e.g., Charles R. B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adop-
tion of the International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543, 543–46 (giving an overview of many arguments re-
garding first-to-file priority). 
 137. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 52 (2011). 
 138. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 139. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 52 (2011). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See EPC, supra note 50, at art. 78. 
 142. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 121. 
 143. See Press Release, Merchant & Gould P.C., supra note 86. 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a); Polymer Indus. Prods. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
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claim that a patent is invalid when they are sued for infringe-
ment, then she cannot bring an invalidity suit after the in-
fringement claim is litigated. Because of this, nearly every time 
a person is sued for infringement, they are likely to bring an 
invalidity counterclaim. Therefore, while removing the best 
mode defense, may reduce the ways in which an invalidity suit 
may be successful, it will probably not reduce validity litigation 
on its own. It may, however, by removing an extremely subjec-
tive defense to infringement, strengthen patents overall.145 
2. Post-Grant Review 
Like the removal of the “best mode” defense, the institution 
of the post-grant review is an attempt at international patent 
harmonization.146 For the most part, the post-grant review mir-
rors the opposition proceedings in Europe. Both proceedings 
must be initiated within the first nine months after a patent is 
issued, both are contentious proceedings between two parties, 
and, in both, evidence can be admitted beyond printed prior 
art.147 The issues that may be raised are also more similar now. 
                                                          
Inc., 347 F.3d 935, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that patent infringement 
claims are compulsory counterclaims in declaratory judgment actions assert-
ing non-infringement and invalidity); Akzona, Inc. v. E. I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 662 F. Supp. 603, 618 (D. Del. 1987) (“In the instant case, 
both the declaratory judgment action and the counterclaim arise out of the 
same patents and both seek to define the scope and determine the validity of 
those patents. Such a situation is clearly within the mandate of Rule 13(a).”); 
Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 293 F. Supp. 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(“[I]f this Court were to view the California complaint as a claim for infringe-
ment, it would in its discretion stay the action for declaratory relief because 
Deering Milliken must raise the issue of invalidity as a compulsory counter-
claim in California, and therefore, the subject matter of both suits would be 
identical.”). 
 145. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 52 (2011) (explaining the rationale be-
hind removing the best mode defense). 
 146. See generally id. at 39–40 (highlighting the importance of harmoniza-
tion in the patent reform debate). Additionally,  
[h]armonization’s major benefit is that it cuts legal fees, particularly 
for pharmaceutical inventions, whose applications are typically filed 
in several countries. Second, harmonization cuts down on “forum 
shopping” in multicountry litigation enforcement efforts. Third, har-
monization creates certainty of patent rights. Businesses need to 
know what actions in different countries are going to be covered by a 
given patent. Fourth, harmonization creates value. The more certain-
ty you bring to the scope of a patent worldwide, the more value you 
create. 
Michael D. Kaminski, Patents and Property: International Harmonization, 4 
MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY 36, 37 (2001). 
 147. Compare Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 
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As previously stated, in an opposition one may raise issues in-
cluding a lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, lack of indus-
trial application, lack of adequate disclosure, an inadmissible 
amendment, or that the subject matter is not an invention or a 
patentable subject matter.148 In the post-grant review issues of 
patentability—including novelty and non-obviousness—may be 
raised in addition to any deficiencies in disclosure.149 Disclo-
sures may be deficient when they do not clearly state the in-
vention in such a way as to enable a “person skilled in the per-
tinent art or science to make and use the invention without 
involving extensive experimentation.”150 Previously, only issues 
of patentability could be raised.151 On February 9, 2012, the 
USPTO submitted for public comment the proposed procedural 
rule for post-grant review.152 Under the current rules the post-
grant review will be a trial with limited set motions, amend-
ments, and discovery, and a party would be allowed to amend 
the claim at issue to address the questions brought forth by the 
post-grant review.153 While the USPTO defines a trial as a con-
tested case,154 it is unclear if there will be oral argument like 
the European system or merely paper motions and petitions, 
much like current proceedings.155 There is one major difference 
between the two systems. The opposition system only invokes 
estoppel when a patent is entirely revoked, while the post-grant 
review system estops all parties from arguing any issue that 
was raised or reasonably could have been raised in the proceed-
ings regardless of the outcome.156 In general, however, the new 
post-grant review is quite similar to the opposition system es-
tablished in Europe. 
                                                          
6(d), 125 Stat. 284, 306 (2011), with EPC, supra note 50, at art. 99. 
 148. MUIR ET AL., supra note 51, at 237; EPC, supra note 50, at art. 100. 
 149. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(d). 
 150. MPEP, supra note 2, at § 608.01(g). 
 151. MUELLER, supra note 3, at 257, 259–61. 
 152. 77 Fed. Reg. 6868 (Feb. 9, 2012). 
 153. 77 Fed. Reg. 7060 at 7079–80 (Feb. 10, 2012). 
 154. Press Release, Sughrue Mion PLLC, USPTO’s Rule Proposals for Post-
Grant Review (Feb. 13, 2012) available at http://www.sughrue.com/USPTOS-
Rule-Proposals-for-Post-Grant-Review-02-13-2012/. 
 155. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 
6(a),(d), 125 Stat. 284, 299, 306 (2011). 
 156. Id. at sec. 6(a); Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 280. 
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Despite the importance of harmonization, a decrease in lit-
igation is a more prominent goal of the post-grant review.157 If 
there is an increase in the use of post-grant review over the in-
ter partes reexamination, the combination of the number of is-
sues able to be raised with the robust estoppel provisions will 
reduce the number of invalidity suits that can be brought in 
federal court.158 Many issues existed in the old system, which 
reduced its overall use.159 The new system addresses many of 
these.160 First, there is now an option for settlement.161 Second, 
the petitioners have greater involvement in the proceedings,162 
and finally, much more can be produced as evidence and more 
issues can be brought up.163 As previously established, the post-
grant system is very similar to the opposition system, and evi-
dence shows that around five percent of patents in Europe trig-
ger an opposition proceeding.164 If the post-grant review was 
used at a similar rate, this alone would be a significant in-
crease over the approximately 0.3% of patents subject to inter 
partes and ex partes reexaminations in the United States.165 
And when considered in light of the fact that, unlike validity 
challenges in federal courts, which have a clear and convincing 
evidence standard, post-grant review would have a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, many seeking to invalidate a pa-
tent may find the new post-grant system an attractive option, 
increasing overall use. Furthermore, under the current regula-
tions all post-grant reviews must be completed within one 
year.166 
There are significant institutional differences between the 
                                                          
 157. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, 38–40 (2011) (outlining the pur-
pose of America Invents). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 266–70. 
 161. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a). 
 162. Compare id. with MPEP, supra note 2, at §§ 2654–2659 (highlighting 
that a settlement option did not exist previously and has been added in Ameri-
ca Invents). 
 163. Compare Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a) with MPEP, su-
pra note 2, at § 2658 (highlighting the different evidence rules between the old 
system and the system under America Invents). 
 164. DIETMAR HARHOFF, INST. FOR INNOVATION RESEARCH, ECONOMIC 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A UNIFIED AND INTEGRATED EUROPEAN PATENT 
LITIGATION SYSTEM 45 (2009). 
 165. ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, supra note 44, at 129, 137; Carlson & 
Migliorini, supra note 43, at 269. 
 166. 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48757 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
FOSSEN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2013  11:51 AM 
592 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
United States and Europe, however, which will dampen the 
overall increase in use. First, patent infringement and court 
based validity challenges are handled on a country by country 
basis in Europe.167 If one wishes to avoid wide scale litigation 
across all EPC countries she must invalidate the patent at the 
EPO level through opposition.168 U.S. patents, on the other 
hand, are litigated between parties only once in the federal 
courts, not in each individual district.169 A single decision re-
garding invalidity from either the PTAB or the federal courts 
will be binding across the entire country.170 Because both ven-
ues have the same result, it is unlikely that a potential peti-
tioner will choose post-grant review over an invalidity suit for 
that reason alone. 
Second, opposition has much less robust estoppel provi-
sions.171 In Europe only the patent holder is estopped from ar-
guments, and only if the patent is revoked in its entirety.172 
This makes the proceeding much more friendly to the petition-
er, as there are far fewer risks if the opposition fails and an in-
fringement proceeding is brought.173 All defenses to that in-
fringement are still available to the potential petitioner.174 The 
post-grant review has a much higher risk.175 Not only is the pa-
tent holder estopped if the patent is revoked, both she and the 
petitioner are also estopped from raising any issue that was or 
could have been raised in the proceedings.176 If a post-grant re-
                                                          
 167. See Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 276. 
 168. Id. 
 169. The concept of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to patent cas-
es in the federal court system. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322, 327–28; David P. Hoult v. Jennifer Hoult, 157 F.3d 29, 31–32 (1st 
Cir. 1998); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 170. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 439 U.S. at 327–28; Hoult, 157 F.3d at 
31–32; Car Carriers, Inc., 789 F.2d at 595. 
 171. See Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43, at 280. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Compare id., with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, sec. 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011) (explaining possible reasons for low uti-
lization of reexamination proceedings and highlighting the changes that in-
crease these risks). 
 176. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a). 
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view fails and an infringement proceeding is brought against 
the petitioner, a major defense against infringement has been 
removed.177 While the evidence standard is lower in post-grant 
review, some would still be unwilling to take this risk in case of 
litigation.178 The robust estoppel provisions will streamline the 
litigation process for patents that have gone through post-grant 
review, but may reduce the overall use of the post-grant review 
system and, as a result, may reduce the overall effect of AIA on 
reducing patent litigation. 
Finally, there is an institutional bias in the United States 
for counterclaims.179 In fact, invalidity is a compulsory counter-
claim when there is an infringement suit.180 In Germany, on 
the other hand, validity is not even permitted as a defense in 
an infringement proceeding, as invalidity must be claimed and 
litigated in a separate proceeding.181 AIA does allow for a stay 
in infringement litigation if a potential infringer wishes to in-
stitute a post-grant review instead of a counterclaim.182 This 
option, however, is unlikely to be used with any real frequency. 
First, invalidity is a natural defense in any infringement litiga-
tion, and there are very few practicing patent litigators who are 
also eligible and experienced in practicing in proceedings before 
the PTAB.183 With the exception of the new pro hac vice recent-
ly allowed by the USPTO for the new administrative issues on-
ly (inter partes review, post-grant review, covered business 
method review, and derivation), in order to bring or defend 
                                                          
 177. See id. 
 178. Additionally, the lower evidentiary standard is already in place in in-
ter partes reexamination. If the lower standard were to increase the number of 
individuals willing to use the proceedings, the increase would already be fac-
tored into the data regarding old proceedings. 
 179. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a); Polymer Indus. Prods. v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 347 F.3d 935, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Akzona, Inc. v. E. I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 662 F. Supp. 603, 618 (D. Del. 1987); Deering Mil-
liken, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 293 F. Supp. 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 180. Polymer Indus. Prods., 347 F.3d at 938. 
 181. JAN WILLEMS, SOME REMARKS ABOUT INVALIDITY AS A DEFENSE IN 
EUROPEAN PATENT INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS (2001), available at 
http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/open_materials/10th/en/willems2-en.pdf. 
 182. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a). 
 183. In order to be eligible to practice before the PTAB one must pass the 
Patent Bar Exam. To even be eligible to sit for the exam one must generally 
have at least an undergraduate degree in a science or technology related field. 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR 
ADMISSION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 1–7 (2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/grb.pdf. 
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against a post-grant review the lawyer must be registered to 
practice before the USPTO, which requires a science back-
ground and an admissions exam.184 While most large firms will 
have both prosecutors and litigators, it may not be the case 
that they have a litigator who has also been admitted to prac-
tice before the USPTO. While they can utilize pro hac vice, they 
will still require the assistance of a registered patent attorney 
to assist in the proceedings. 
Additionally, it is very possible that patent holders, as part 
of their litigation strategy, will wait until after the nine-month 
period has expired to begin sending cease-and-desist letters 
and filing infringement suits. There is no statute of limitations 
for patent infringement, but monetary damages are limited to 
infringements occurring in the six years prior to the filing of 
the suit.185 Even when adding on the three-year average prose-
cution period, waiting nine months after issuance will not limit 
the legal remedies of the patent holder.186 Yet by following this 
strategy the patent holder avoids giving notice of possible in-
fringement issues and thereby avoids having her patent’s valid-
ity challenged in a venue that only requires a preponderance of 
the evidence.187 It is important to note, however, that this 
strategy may reduce the damages that can be collected by the 
patent holder, especially when the patent is for a product.188 If 
the subject of a patent is not labeled with the proper patent in-
formation, the infringer is only liable for any infringement that 
occurs after it has knowledge of the patent.189 When the patent 
in question is for a machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or if the patent is properly labeled to indicate that 
there is a patent, no actual knowledge on the part of the in-
                                                          
 184. Id.; James Donald Smith, Message from Chief Judge James Donald 
Smith, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences: USPTO Discusses Key As-
pects of New Administrative Patent Trials, USPTO.GOV,  http://www.uspto.gov/ 
aia_implementation/smith-blog-extravaganza.jsp#heading-4 (last updated 
May 21, 2012). 
 185. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006). 
 186. Patents protect inventions starting on the date that the application is 
filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a). 
 187. See 35 U.S.C. § 286; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a). 
 188. 35 U.S.C. § 287. Processes are exempt from the labeling requirement. 
35 U.S.C. § 287(a). 
 189. Id. 
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fringer is required.190 This provision applies to monetary dam-
ages only; injunctions can still be sought as filing of a suit con-
stitutes notice on the part of the patent holder.191 The similari-
ties between the new post-grant review and the opposition 
system, therefore, may lead to an increase in the use of post-
grant review, but the differences in the system as well as the 
institutional differences between patent litigation in Europe 
and the United States will significantly dampen this increase. 
In addition to all of these factors, the fees for filing a post-grant 
review are large. To file a post-grant review of up to twenty 
claims is $35,800, and each additional claim is $800.192 
That being said, if a patent goes through the post-grant re-
view proceeding and survives, it will be significantly stronger, 
at least with regards to the petitioner. The petitioner will be 
unable to argue that the patent is invalid on any of the possible 
post-grant review grounds and will have to overcome the clear 
and convincing evidence standard for any other validity is-
sues.193 This will make it much harder to invalidate a patent 
that has gone through post-grant review. 
3. Inter Partes Review 
Like post-grant review, inter partes review can increase the 
strength of patents and as a result reduce validity litigation.194 
The combination of estoppel provisions and the increased bur-
den of proof in federal courts would make it more difficult to 
successfully challenge the validity of a patent that has gone 
through an inter partes review. As it is currently structured, 
however, there are only two major changes to the inter partes 
review from the old inter partes reexamination: the addition of 
a settlement option and the shift to a reasonable likelihood 
standard for initiating a proceeding.195 These additions alone 
are unlikely to increase the use of inter partes review over inter 
partes reexamination.196 The same barriers to use that exist in 
                                                          
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. AIA Frequently Asked Questions, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
aia_implementation/faq.jsp#heading-8 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
 193. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, sec. 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011). 
 194. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See generally id. (outlining all changes in patent law to institute the 
inter partes review). 
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post-grant review exist in this context as well, with one notable 
exception. The inter partes review can be filed after the nine-
month publication period.197 There is still, however, an institu-
tional bias towards validity litigation in response to an in-
fringement suit, and there are very few practitioners who are 
willing and able to practice before the PTAB in inter partes re-
views.198 Additionally, the old limits to what issues can be 
raised—a significant new issue of patentability only—and what 
evidence can be presented—printed prior art only—still ex-
ist.199 These limits are arguably more of a barrier to the use of 
the inter partes reexamination and the new inter partes review 
than the inability to settle.200 As a result, it is unlikely that in-
ter partes review will be used any more frequently than inter 
partes reexamination has been in the past, and the minor 
changes that AIA has made to this proceeding are unlikely to 
increase the strength of issued patents or decrease validity liti-
gation. 
B. A SIMPLE SOLUTION: MORE FRONT-END REVIEW 
International patent regime harmonization is accom-
plished by the “best mode” changes and the post-grant review, 
and U.S. patents can be strengthened by the new proceedings if 
they are used. U.S. patent strength, however, will not be signif-
icantly increased, nor will validity litigation be decreased, be-
cause it is unlikely that there will be a significant increase in 
the use of the post-grant review or inter partes review over the 
inter partes reexamination. In fact, due to civil procedure rules, 
validity litigation in response to infringement actions may nev-
er be reduced, but patent strength may still be increased 
through a more stringent pre-grant review. The increase in pa-
                                                          
 197. Id. 
 198. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a); Polymer Indus. Prods. v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 347 F.3d 935, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Akzona, Inc. v. E. I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 662 F. Supp. 603, 618 (D. Del. 1987); Deering Mil-
liken, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 293 F. Supp. 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). These cases 
establish the compulsory counterclaim requirement in the United States. 
 199. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (2006), and MPEP, supra note 2, at § 
2609, with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6(a) (outlining the old re-
quirements and highlighting the lack of alternation in America Invents). 
 200. See generally Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 43 (explaining the rea-
sons for the low utilization of the inter partes reexamination). 
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tent strength, in turn, may shift the balance between patent 
holders and alleged infringers in favor of the holders, increas-
ing the overall rate of settlement in these cases. As previously 
stated, possible causes for the decrease in patent quality in-
clude an overburdened USPTO examiner staff, a high patent 
approval rate, uncertainty as to the standards for newly pa-
tentable technologies, and a dilution of the non-obviousness re-
quirement.201 By addressing these concerns and narrowing 
claim construction, the strength of issued patents will be in-
creased. The following are a few of the many possible reform 
measures that could be taken to ensure more front-end review 
and increase the quality of issued patents.202 These are merely 
suggestions and it is not the scope of this Note to address the 
merits of these in any depth. 
1. Third-Party Submissions 
The AIA already attempts to assist in strengthening front-
end review by increasing the ability of third parties to submit 
relevant prior art prior to submission.203 Under the current sys-
tem, a third party could submit published prior art, but could 
not even highlight the relevant portions to assist the examin-
ers, let alone explain why the submission was relevant.204 By 
allowing third parties to submit more information in an effec-
tive manner, it is more likely that examiners will have access to 
all relevant prior art before making decisions about the novelty 
and obviousness of an invention.205 This means that it is less 
likely that previously unknown prior art will come up in post-
grant proceedings or federal court invalidity suits, thereby the 
strength of issued patents will be increased. The new provision 
will only be helpful to the extent that patent examiners are 
able to review the incoming information. 
2. Narrower Claim Construction, Stronger Non-Obviousness 
Requirement 
Currently, applicants can claim the broadest possible in-
vention at the initial stages.206 This means that it is possible 
                                                          
 201. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 80. 
 202. Other reforms may include construing ambiguous claims against the 
drafter, limiting continuations, etc. 
 203. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 8(a). 
 204. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2011); MPEP, supra note 2, § 1134. 
 205. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, 49 (2011). 
 206. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
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that an individual may receive a patent that covers more than 
just what they invented.207 This is often considered a reward 
for being the first to come up with a great idea, but overly 
broad patents can lead to increased infringement and validity 
litigation.208 Courts, therefore, are often required to narrow 
claims in order to make the patent true to the original inven-
tion.209 The AIA did not address the scope of claims, so, in order 
to fix these issues, narrower claims should be required at the 
onset by the USPTO.210 As the breadth of claims is typically de-
termined by the USPTO examiners, USPTO regulations would 
need to be amended to ensure narrower claim scope.211 Nar-
rower claims could be established by increasing the number of 
rejections for over-breadth or non-enablement, defining more 
precisely the scope of the claims through the communications of 
the applicant with the examiner and the USPTO, and by re-
quiring more statements by the examiners at issuance.212 Right 
now, examiners are allowed to submit a “Reason for Allowance” 
with the patent to explain why it was allowed if the record as a 
whole does not reflect the reasons why it was allowed.213 These 
statements can be used as evidence for claim breadth in litiga-
tion, but are generally not required to be written when the ap-
plication is allowed.214 Additionally, the claimed subject matter 
could also be narrowed through a more stringent non-
                                                          
banc) (“The Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’) determines the scope of 
claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but 
upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction . . . .”); MPEP, supra 
note 2, at § 2111. 
 207. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316–17. 
 208. Overly broad patents also cause an anti-commons problem in new 
technologies, which stifles innovation. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nano-
technology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 618–19 (2005). 
 209. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 25. 
 210. NAS recommends narrowing claims on overly broad patents after is-
suance. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 96. I, however, am argu-
ing for narrowing the claims pre-issuance and thereby increasing the predict-
ability of patent enforcement. 
 211. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 2173.04. The breadth of a claim can also be 
determined by the federal courts after issuance, but the large deference given 
to the USPTO limits the courts’ effectiveness. 
 212. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(e) (2011); MPEP, supra note 2, § 1302.14. 
 213. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(e); MPEP, supra note 2, § 1302.14. 
 214. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(e); MPEP, supra note 2, § 1302.14. 
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obviousness requirement, as suggested by NAS.215 By making it 
harder to clear the obviousness hurdle, fewer claims would be 
allowed, and those that do make it would probably be more 
narrowly tailored. That being said, NAS only recognized an is-
sue with non-obviousness for business method and genetics pa-
tents.216 
By narrowing what a patent covers there will be fewer pos-
sible prior-art challenges, fewer validity challenges, more con-
sistent interpretation in the courts, and fewer cases of possible 
infringement.217 This will, in turn, reduce litigation and 
strengthen the patents that are issued. Additionally, as most of 
these changes regarding scope will be implemented through 
USPTO regulations, no additional legislation will have to be 
passed through Congress, allowing for quicker implementation 
of necessary reforms. These changes will, however, come at a 
cost. There will be less protection for cutting-edge inventions, 
more documentation and communication will be required to de-
fine the scope of the claims; as a result, there will be a need for 
even more USTPO examiners. The non-obviousness require-
ment will have to be altered by the Federal Circuit.218 Addi-
tionally, these changes will signal a major shift in U.S. patent 
mentality and will create much confusion and litigation in the 
first decade or so. 
3. More Examiners 
The backlog at the USPTO presents a significant problem 
as to the strength of patents.219 There is a serious push to 
shorten the amount of time between an application’s submis-
sion and a patent’s issuance. Because the staff of examiners at 
the USPTO is limited, in order to fulfill the demand each exam-
iner must work on more patents at a quicker rate.220 This may 
result in rushing patent applications. Prior-art searches will 
not be as thorough, and there will be more reliance on appli-
                                                          
 215. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 59–62. 
 216. Id. at 87–95. The report also covers ways to reinvigorate the non-
obviousness requirement, including expert testimony and a focus on the tech-
nological hurdle that the inventor needed to overcome. Id. 
 217. See Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indetermi-
nate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 57, 91–92 (2008). 
 218. See id. at 64–65. 
 219. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 51, 65. 
 220. See id. at 65. 
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cants to provide all relevant information. By rushing patent 
applications, the likelihood that invalidating issues will be 
found in issued patents down the road will increase. Prior art 
that was not disclosed or found may be discovered in the course 
of litigation, or patents may be invalidated for claiming more 
than they had a right to. In order to ensure that all applica-
tions are thoroughly and carefully reviewed in an acceptable 
period of time, there must be an increase in the number of ex-
aminers. Additionally, in order to properly institute third-party 
submissions and a narrower claim construction, there must be 
a sufficiently large staff in order to decrease the likelihood of an 
increased backlog. Hiring additional examiners will be an ex-
pensive process, though. AIA has attempted to address this is-
sue by granting the USPTO fee-setting authority, but it did not 
grant spending authority.221 Under AIA, in order for the fund-
ing to be sufficient for the hiring of new examiners the USPTO 
will continue to need the budget approval of Congress, and this 
will continue until Congress grants the USPTO spending au-
thority as well, establishing it as a financially independent 
government organization.222 It is highly unlikely that this will 
happen in the near future, as any changes that could result in a 
decrease in incoming federal funds will be strongly opposed in 
the current budget environment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Beginning in 2004, calls have been made to update the 
U.S. patent system, to make it more efficient, to create stronger 
patents, to reduce litigation, and to harmonize the U.S. regime 
with the international patent community.223 The AIA attempts 
to address many of these issues. The question remains, howev-
er, if these changes will meet their intended goals. 
The AIA has managed to address many of the major differ-
ences between U.S. and European patent law.224 It has shifted 
the United States from first-to-invent to first-to-file,225 it has 
                                                          
 221. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 10, 125 
Stat. 284, 316 (2011). 
 222. Id. 
 223. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 38–40 (2011). 
 224. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, secs. 3, 6(a), 15. 
 225. Id. at sec. 3. 
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dropped the “best mode” defense in validity litigation,226 and it 
has instituted a post-grant review system modeled after the 
European patent opposition.227 Yet the post-grant system es-
tablished by AIA falls short of its intended goals to reduce va-
lidity litigation and strengthen issued patents. If the post-grant 
review system is used at a significant rate, it will strengthen 
patents because the increase in what issues can be raised and 
the robust estoppel provisions will greatly reduce what can be 
challenged in federal court. One may believe that because it is 
so similar to the European system it would be used at a similar 
rate (around five percent), and it may be used more frequently 
because many of the issues with the old inter partes reexamina-
tion have been addressed (including what issues can be raised, 
what evidence can be used, and the ability to settle prior to a 
ruling from the BPAI). Because of the institutional differences 
between the United States and Europe, however, it is unlikely 
that there will be such a large increase in the use of the post-
grant system in the United States. First, it is unnecessary to 
invalidate a patent through the USPTO in order to avoid dupli-
cative litigation.228 Second, the estoppel provisions, while 
slightly countered by the lower evidence standard, tie the 
hands of litigators when it comes to defending against in-
fringement.229 Finally, due to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
13(a), there is an institutional bias for counterclaims in patent 
litigation.230 As a result, the post-grant process is unlikely to be 
used at a significant rate, and as a result patents are unlikely 
to be any stronger than before. 
In order to increase the strength of issued patents, the pa-
tents must be stronger prior to entering the post-grant review 
and litigation phase. The AIA takes a step in the right direction 
by increasing what can be submitted by third parties prior to 
issuance.231 In order to truly strengthen the issued patents, 
                                                          
 226. Id. at sec. 15. 
 227. Id. at sec. 6(a). 
 228. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1979); Hoult 
v. Hoult, 157 F.3d 29, 31–32 (1st Cir. 1998); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 789 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 229. See Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 327–28; Hoult, 157 F.3d at 31–
32; Car Carriers, Inc., 789 F.2d at 595. 
 230. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a); Polymer Indus. Prods. v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 347 F.3d 935, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Akzona, Inc. v. E. I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 662 F. Supp. 603, 618 (D. Del. 1987); Deering Mil-
liken, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 293 F. Supp. 518, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 231. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec 8(a). 
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however, the patent office must also increase the number of ex-
aminers and narrow claim construction. This will result in a 
longer and more thorough patent application process, which 
will increase strains on an already overburdened and ineffi-
cient system. However, if the overall goal is to reduce litigation 
and increase patent strength, the changes are necessary. 
 
 
 
 
